Biases in the quantitative measurement of values for public decisions.

Abstract

Measurement of personal values in terms of money or utility can promote efficient public decisions about environmental and risk regulation, health care, and so forth. Current measures are subject to several biases. Quantitative judgments of value are often based on a concept of importance that ignores the quantity of the good being valued. They are sensitive to irrelevant factors, such as cost of the good (vs. its benefit) and whether it has been reduced by human action or nature. Some judgments are based on moral opinions about actions rather than on the value of consequences. Some of these problems seem solvable by methods that remove irrelevant information or force attention to relevant information. Other problems are less tractable. Their solution should be a high priority for research. Around the world, governments and other institutions are trying to make decisions more rationally. More officials, and more of the citizens they represent, are asking which of the options available to them does the best job of trading off relevant values against each other. For example, should women under Age 50 get yearly mammograms to detect breast cancer, despite the extra

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