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Dynamic costly state verification
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Dynamic costly state verification (2004)Dynamic costly state verificationMoney and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information (2000)Money and Dynamic Credit Arra…Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance (1995)Efficiency and Equality in a …How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic Versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment (1994)How Good Are Standard Debt Co…On Efficient Distribution with Private Information (1992)On Efficient Distribution wit…Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)Monitoring and Reputation: Th…Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima (1991)Computing Multi-Period, Infor…The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts (1990)The dynamic structure of opti…Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (1990)Income fluctuation and asymme…Financial intermediation (1989)Financial intermediationAgency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And …Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans (1987)Some evidence on the uniquene…On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)On Repeated Moral Hazard with…Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing (1986)Costly monitoring, financial …Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem (1985)Incentive-Compatible Debt Con…Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Financial Intermediation and …Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Optimal contracts and competi…EQUILIBRIUM IN A PURE CURRENCY ECONOMY (1980)Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and Constant Discounting (1995)Chapter 8 Micro data and general equilibrium models (1999)Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation (2003)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Theory ahead of business-cycle measurement (1986)Financial Constraints Risk (2006)Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity (2008)Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008 (2009)ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES* (1974)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor (1995)Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? (2000)Distance and Private Information in Lending (2010)The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment (1996)Optimal Unemployment Insurance (1997)Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (2004)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Resolving the scale efficiency puzzle in banking (1993)Banks and innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms☆ (2008)Bank competition and financial stability in Asia Pacific (2013)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity (1983)The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data (1994)Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector (1997)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? (2000)The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income (1981)Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts (1988)Communication, commitment, and growth (1992)Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage (2001)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)Theory of Value (1959)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets (1989)Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships (1990)The role of capital in financial institutions (1995)
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References

  • 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring8,393 cited
  • 1988Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations4,382 cited
  • 1991Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt3,294 cited
  • 1979Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification3,201 cited
  • 1985Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem1,799 cited
  • 1987Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans1,609 cited
  • 1986Costly monitoring, financial intermediation, and equilibrium credit rationing775 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 1992On Efficient Distribution with Private Information490 cited
  • 1990Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem363 cited
  • 1991Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima268 cited
  • 1995Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance157 cited
  • 1994How Good Are Standard Debt Contracts? Stochastic Versus Nonstochastic Monitoring in a Costly State Verification Environment146 cited
  • 1989Financial intermediation145 cited
  • 2000Money and Dynamic Credit Arrangements with Private Information

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105 cited
  • 1990The dynamic structure of optimal debt contracts59 cited
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