Thinking about threats

Abstract

The development of a science of threat systems is a desirable but slow-dangerously slow-process (cf. Boulding, 1963). The uneven evolution of this science has given it several characteristics of doubtful value. In first place, has acquired military connotations. When a student of international politics refers to the strategists, he usually has in mind those who are primarily concerned with military policy-and he expects other students of international politics to know that this is what he has in mind. Although there are many nonmilitary situations in international politics in which ability of one nation to gain its ends depends to an important degree on what other nations do (cf. Schelling, 1960, p. 5), such situations are rarely viewed as strategic. Even within field of military affairs, term usually connotes a concern with nuclear deterrence policies. Although valuable contributions to theorizing about threats by students of nuclear strategy must be acknowledged, it would be undesirable to treat such theories as exclusive province of such scholars. In addition to its military connotations, concept of strategic thought has become associated with game theory. Thinking about however, is too important to be left to game theorists. For example, after a highly stimulating discussion of threats, Schelling (1960, p. 184) talks about them as if importance of his discussion lay in having found a rationale for such tactics in game theory terms. But what if Schelling had failed to find a niche in game theory for fractional threats? Should we then forget about them? Such tactics are clearly phenomena of real world. Many students of international politics can benefit from Schelling's imaginative discussions regardless of their implications for game theory. This might be called problem of to without getting caughtthat is, how can student of international politics steal Schellings's ideas without getting caught by Schelling's game theory orientation? For many students of international politics, primary significance of Schelling's work lies in improved understanding of real world, not in his contributions to game theory. Threats pervade human relations and should not be discussed solely in terms of nuclear deterrence or game theory. The purpose of this paper is to broaden context within which threats are discussed by looking at selected aspects of recent thinking about threats from a more general perspective than that of either game theory or nuclear strategy. The discussion will focus on: (1) basic concept of threat, (2) relationship between threats and promises, (3) coerciveness of (4) costs of (5) role of ambiguity in threat systems, and (6) relationship between threats and concept of deterrence.

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