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Pay for performance is an organizational control mechanism intended to align the interests of employer and employee. We investigated whether employee risk preference interferes with the effects of this ‘control by pay’ on attitudinal and behavioural outcomes. We found that the degree of consistency between risk preference and control by pay affected withdrawal intentions, contingent pay satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviour, as hypothesized. The results suggest that the use of pay for performance as a control mechanism should take into account employee risk preference, and that this concern should apply broadly in the organization, not just at the executive level.
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Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 52 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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