Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed

Marcel Weverbergh

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

This note reanalyzes the following problem, formerly treated by Wilson (Wilson, R. B. 1967. Competitive bidding with asymmetric information. Management Sci. 13 (July) 816–820): two parties have to submit bids for an object One of them knows the value with certainty, the other does not. The equilibrium derived differs from Wilson's solution and yields a simple explanation for the case cited by Wilson: the value of the game is essentially zero for the party with incomplete information.

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1960Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming, and Economics.1967Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information

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2004Putting Auction Theory to Work 2007Modeling and analysis of an auction-based logistics market 2000Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?2020Peaches, lemons, and cookies: Designing auction markets with dispersed information 2003Common Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse 2010Does Asymmetric Information Affect the Premium in Mergers and Acquisitions?

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