Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods

Mark Gradstein

58 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Economic Policies and Impacts Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

In this paper a dynamic model of the provision of a public good with incomplete information is developed. For a finite population, in addition to the standard underprovision type of results, inefficiency occurs because of a delay in contributions. For an infinite population, although delay may disappear, underprovision remains so that equilibrium is still inefficient. Policy implications of these results are described, emphasis being put on possible government intervention with incomplete information.

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References

1996The Use of Knowledge in Society 1985Clio and the economics of QWERTY 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 1982The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 1986On the private provision of public goods 1984Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods Through Voluntary Contributions 1988Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism 1979Incentives and incomplete information

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1998Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

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