Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

Leslie M. Max · Steven A. Matthews

280 citations0/0 files storedThe Review of Economic Studies

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We consider the dynamic private provision of funds to projects that generate public benefits. Participants have complete information about the environment, but imperfect information about individual actions: each period they observe only the aggregate contribution. Each player may contribute any amount in any period before the contributing horizon is reached. All Nash equilibrium outcomes are characterized. In many cases they are all also perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes. If the horizon is long, if the players' preferences are similar, and if they are patient or the period length is short, perfect Bayesian equilibria exist that essentially complete the project. In some of them the completion time shrinks to zero with the period length—efficiency is achieved in the limit.

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References

19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 1986On the private provision of public goods 1988Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism 1991Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 1989Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions 1984Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis 1984Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good

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