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An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems
8 references·5 citing·36 second hop
An investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems (1985)An investigation into the relative manipu…Social Choice and Individual Values (2017)Social Choice and Individual …American political science review (1983)American political science re…Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function (1977)Single Transferrable Vote: An…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Manipulation of Voting Scheme…A comparative analysis of group decision methods (1971)A comparative analysis of gro…A mathematical solution for the probability of the paradox of voting (1968)A mathematical solution for t…Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)Social Choice and Individual …Direct voting and proxy voting (2014)Direct voting and proxy votingWhere are the hard manipulation problems (2011)Where are the hard manipulati…Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules (2006)Some Further Results on the M…A chaotic Exploration of Aggregation Paradoxes (1995)A chaotic Exploration of Aggr…Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't (1993)Almost all social choice rule…The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (1968)Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1972)Political institutions: democracy and social choice (2002)If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule (2003)Ballot (and voter) “exhaustion” under Instant Runoff Voting: An examination of four ranked-choice elections (2014)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Manipulability measures of common social choice functions (1999)Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation (2002)Strategy-proof Social Choice (2010)A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures (1956)An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)The Logic of Collective Action (1965)Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk (2016)Binary Voting with Delegable Proxy: An Analysis of Liquid Democracy (2017)Liquid Democracy: An Algorithmic Perspective (2018)Les théories de l’intérêt général et le problème logique de l’agrégation (1952)Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments During the Last Decade (1961)Majority Decision-Making with Partial Unidimensionality (1969)The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution (1976)Paradox of voting under an urn model: The effect of homogeneity (1985)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1953)Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (1976)A comparative analysis of social choice functions, IV (1981)New problems in the general choice theory (1985)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Well-being : the foundations of hedonic psychology (1999)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness (1977)A Politics of Institutional Choice (1997)Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in Developing Countries (2004)Behavioral Assumptions of Policy Tools (1990)Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House (2004)Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform" (2004)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1951Social Choice and Individual Values.7,792 cited
  • 1973Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result3,211 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1983American political science review839 cited
  • 2017Social Choice and Individual Values395 cited
  • 1968A mathematical solution for the probability of the paradox of voting149 cited
  • 1977Single Transferrable Vote: An Example of a Perverse Social Choice Function141 cited
  • 1971A comparative analysis of group decision methods101 cited

Cited by

  • 1993Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't85 cited
  • 2014Direct voting and proxy voting82 cited
  • 1995A chaotic Exploration of Aggregation Paradoxes73 cited
  • 2011Where are the hard manipulation problems59 cited
  • 2006Some Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules59 cited

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