No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
We examined the effects of unsystematic and systematic firm risk on CEO compensation risk bearing and total pay. Both the proportion of variable pay in the CEO pay package and the magnitude of the CEO pay package are curvilinearly related to unsystematic firm risk, i.e. they are highest under conditions of moderate firm-specific risk. Our results are consistent with agency predictions that both performance contingent pay and the greater earnings potential associated with that form of pay are highest when the agent has greater control over performance outcomes. In Press- AMJ 4 Recent research on CEO pay has moved away from decades of mostly futile attempts to find blanket evidence of incentive alignment (linking a portion of executive pay to specific performance criteria) at the top executive ranks. Instead, scholars are shifting their attention towards the identification of those conditions where incentive alignment, and thus risk sharing with CEOs, is most appropriate (e.g., Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Gray & Canella, 1997). Most of this literature has relied on agency theory to predict those situations where placing some of the
Loading…
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 274 citations exist upstream.
Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.