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Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts · Study

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ArticleIntroducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts

Thomas Hemmer1999

Article1999

Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contracts

Thomas Hemmer · Oliver Kim · Robert E. Verrecchia

171 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Accounting and Economics

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Stochastic processes and financial applications

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References

1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1991Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation 1987Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and Financing Decisions 1988Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems 1989Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy 1976Essays on Economic Behavior Under Uncertainty.

Cited by

2016The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment 2003Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets 2001Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey 2006Agency Theory and Management Accounting 2004The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Structure and Risk-Taking Incentives of CEOS 2009CEO Risk‐Related Incentives and Income Smoothing*2003Overconfidence, Investment Policy, and Executive Stock Options 2007Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability, and the Design of Compensation Contracts

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 5 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 5 shared references 1992Risk, managerial effort, and project choicearticle · 4 shared references 2006Agency Theory and Management Accountingchapter · 4 shared references 2013Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got Therechapter · 3 shared references 1998The exercise and valuation of executive stock optionsarticle · 3 shared references

Details

Year1999

Typearticle

Published1999-12-01

VenueJournal of Accounting and Economics

ISSN-L0165-4101

Languageen

Citations171

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1016/s0165-4101(00)00008-2

openalex_workW2037100769

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