Performance accountability in the UN Secretariat – The conflictual way toward more flexibility

Abstract

Abstract The article investigates accountability structures in the Secretariat of the United Nations (UN) by emphasizing the institutional design and the interaction between member states and Secretariat. Empirical findings indicate that reform endeavors toward a more performance‐based accountability in the UN Secretariat have fallen short. The article finds that mistrust between Secretariat and member states and among the member states themselves is predominantly responsible for the identified shortcomings and outlines how polarized the legislative organs – namely the member states – are. Evidently, a substantial concern of the countries represented in the G77 is that an empowerment of the Secretariat would ultimately lead to an empowerment of the influential donor countries and the permanent members of the Security Council. Consequently, the authors identify three main challenges that have to be handled in order to move toward a more performance oriented accountability structure: The creation of a trusting environment and strategic partnerships between the governing bodies, the further empowerment of senior managers, and a review of the current performance management system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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