The Revenue Impact of Repeated Tax Amnesties

Abstract

Proponents argue that tax amnesties raise revenue both in the short and long run, by bringing former nonfilers back into the tax system. Opponents contend that amnesties produce little short‐run revenue and weaken incentives for long‐run tax compliance. However, over the last 21 years, 27 states offered tax amnesties for a second or third time. While previous research has estimated the impact of specific tax amnesties, none have estimated how the impact changes when offered repeatedly. We find that these additional tax amnesties generate less short‐run revenue than predecessors and tend to magnify revenue losses associated with disincentives for long‐run tax compliance.

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