On The Distributional Effects Of Reducing Capital Taxes*

Abstract

This article asks whether household heterogeneity and market incompleteness have quantitatively important implications for the welfare effects of tax changes. We compare a representative‐agent economy to an economy in which households face idiosyncratic uninsurable income risk. The income process is consistent with empirical estimates and implies a realistic wealth distribution. We find that capital tax cuts imply large welfare gains in the representative‐agent economy. However, when households are heterogeneous, substantial redistribution during transition means that only a minority will support capital tax cuts, whereas most households can expect large welfare losses.

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