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When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts · Study

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ArticleWhen to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Stephen E. Spear2004

Article2004

When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Stephen E. Spear · Cheng Wang

86 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

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References

1986Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device 1988Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting 1983Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets 1987Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade 1995Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment 1997Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model

Cited by

2014A theory of political and economic cycles 2012Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts 2009Risk and CEO Turnover 2009A Theory of Firm Decline 2013Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model 2012Executive Accountability Around the World: The Sources of Cross-National Variation in Firm Performance - CEO Dismissal Sensitivity 2021FINANCING VENTURES

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Year2004

Typearticle

Published2004-08-18

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations86

Files0 public / 0

ShelfLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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doi10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.008

openalex_workW2039626832

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