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Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model · Study

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ArticleIncentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model

Cheng Wang1997

Article1997

Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model

69 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Economic Theory

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Auction Theory and Applications

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References

1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 1990Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting 1994Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory 1992On Efficient Distribution with Private Information 1990Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem 1994Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem 1987Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade

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2004Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard 2004When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts 2002Board Remuneration, Company Performance, and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Publicly Listed Malaysian Companies 2008Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non‐linearity and asymmetry 2015Gender and Dynamic Agency: Theory and Evidence on the Compensation of Top Executives

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Year1997

Typearticle

Published1997-09-01

VenueJournal of Economic Theory

ISSN-L0022-0531

Languageen

Citations69

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1006/jeth.1997.2293

openalex_workW2079801567

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2000Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information

2005Stock grants as a commitment device