An Efficient Auction

Motty Perry · Philip J. Reny

138 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

An analogue of Vickrey’s (1961) multi-unit auction is provided when bidders have interdependent values and one-dimensional private information. The analogue is strategically equivalent to a collection of two-bidder single-unit second-price auctions and it possesses an efficient ex-post equilibrium.

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References

1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding 2004An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects 1985Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent 2001Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 1987Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes 2000Efficient Auctions

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2003Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany 2003Asymmetric English auctions 2001Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 2011Robust Mechanism Design 2002Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design 2005An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction 2011Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information 2006Ex Post Implementation

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