Why What Is Counterfactual Really Matters: A Response to Weisberg and Gopnik ()

Abstract

Weisberg and Gopnik (2013) make a compelling case that pretending is central to the development of the sophisticated causal understanding that sets humans apart from other species.Yet, in doing so, they make a surprising claim.They state that counterfactual reasoning ability emerges in very early childhood, alongside pretending and future thinking.In sharp contrast, other cognitive developmentalists have moved from claiming 3-and 4-year-olds think counterfactually (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996;Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998) to believing that this ability emerges even later: Beck and Riggs (2013) argue that thinking about counterfactual worlds emerges around 6 years.Rafetseder, Schwitalla, and Perner (2013) believe this happens in adolescence.Being precise about children's counterfactual thinking is important particularly where developmental findings are informing other cognitive science domains.A first glance suggests the problem may be terminological.For some, typically social scientists, counterfactuals are thoughts about "what might have been," that is, thoughts about alternatives to specific elements of the real world (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008;Mandel, Hilton, & Catellani, 2005).Others, often philosophers, define counterfactuals broadly to include pretend, future and fictional worlds, as well as the "what might have beens" (e.g., Woodward, 2011).Developmental psychologists need to acknowledge these different uses explicitly: Researchers of counterfactual thinking per se and counterfactual emotions have restricted themselves to the former narrow use, here called real-world counterfactuals (e.g.,

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