Anti‐Discrimination Rights Without Equality

Abstract

Anti‐discrimination rights are nearly always thought to be justified or explained by equality, although the precise nature of this relationship is rarely considered. In this article I consider the two most plausible relationships, both of which are commonly at least implicitly asserted: that anti‐discrimination rights are deontic equal treatment norms, and that anti‐discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at achieving telic equality. I try to show that, as a conceptual matter, anti‐discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms: they do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. They allow for different treatment, but they prohibit different treatment only on some grounds. Although the suggestion that anti‐discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at telic equality (in some dimension) is conceptually plausible (like all instrumental relationships), it is most unlikely that anti‐discrimination rights can be justified on this ground.

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