The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective

Abstract

This article considers recent formal models of distributive policy making in the legislature. The article is divided into two major sections. The first section focuses on the theoretical questions underlying the models and highlights their central results. The second section evaluates the models in terms of five main topics. First, the conditions under which a universalistic as opposed to a minimum-winning coalition theoretically prevails are reevaluated. Second, I examine the role of uncertainty in the models and the questions it raises for both modeling and empirical research in this area. Third, the electoral connection among constituencies, legislators, and the distribution of federal benefits is examined and, fourth, the predictions of the models are juxtaposed with empirical research. Finally, the perspectives of distributive policy associated with empirical and formal research are compared and contrasted.

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