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Managerial pay and financial performance of small business
13 references·0 citing·28 second hop
Managerial pay and financial performance of small business (1979)Managerial pay and financial performance …Executive compensation (2008)Executive compensationPay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View (1972)Pay and Organizational Effect…Book Review: Organizational Behavior: Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View (1972)Book Review: Organizational B…Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance (1970)Managerial Pay and Corporate …Management control and the large corporation (1970)Management control and the la…MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP IN THE LARGE FIRM (1969)MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP IN T…The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm. (1965)The Economics of Discretionar…The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (1965)The Economics of Discretionar…Business Behavior, Value and Growth. (1962)Business Behavior, Value and …Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders (1961)Federal Income Taxation of Co…Executive Compensation. (1960)Executive Compensation.The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm (1982)Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers (1984)A Social Information Processing Approach to Job Attitudes and Task Design (1978)The Empowerment Process: Integrating Theory and Practice (1988)Satisfaction and comparison income (1996)The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes. (1981)PERFORMANCE, SLACK, AND RISK TAKING IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING. (1986)IS SLACK GOOD OR BAD FOR INNOVATION? (1996)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Law and Finance (1998)The New Economics of Organization (1984)On strategic networks (1988)Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional Pressures: Do Family-Controlled Firms Pollute Less? (2010)Measurement of human service staff satisfaction: Development of the Job Satisfaction Survey (1985)The External Control of Organizations. (1978)Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 (2003)Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China (2004)The Challenges of Privatization (2004)The Effects of Organizational and Political Embeddedness on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations (2010)Family firms are indeed better places to work than non-family firms! Socioemotional wealth and employees’ perceived organizational caring (2021)STAKEHOLDER‐AGENCY THEORY (1992)The Corporate Social-Financial Performance Relationship (1997)An Empirical Examination of Ownership Structure in Family and Professionally Managed Firms (1992)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 2008Executive compensation2,390 cited
  • 1965The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm973 cited
  • 1962Business Behavior, Value and Growth.888 cited
  • 1972Book Review: Organizational Behavior: Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View823 cited
  • 1965The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm.580 cited
  • 1972Pay and Organizational Effectiveness: A Psychological View454 cited
  • 1970Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance314 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property193 cited
  • 1970Management control and the large corporation190 cited
  • 1969MANAGEMENT AND OWNERSHIP IN THE LARGE FIRM55 cited
  • 1960Executive Compensation.39 cited
  • 1961Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders23 cited

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