Threateners' reactions to prior announcement of behavioral compliance or defiance

Abstract

Fifty subjects, 25 males and 25 females, played a Prisoner's Dilemma game which was modified to permit them to send threats to a simulated player which stated that the latter would be penalized if he did not cooperate on the next trial. The simulated target employed one of four patterns of responding to the threat: open defiance, in which the target both verbally and behaviorally defied the threats; concealed defiance, in which the target either refused to reveal his intentions or lied to the source, but was behaviorally defiant; and open and concealed compliance conditions similarly defined. The results indicated that prior announcement of intentions by the target deterred the source from using the threat in the open defiance condition and “converted” him to a mutual cooperator in the open compliance condition. The concealed conditions, however, encouraged exploitative play by the subjects; this finding was interpreted by a cost analysis. It was concluded that the findings supported Osgood's Grit proposal.

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