SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information
16 references·0 citing·47 second hop
Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information (2000)Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts wit…Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment (1996)Implications of Efficient Ris…Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment (1995)Repeated Moral Hazard and One…On Efficient Distribution with Private Information (1992)On Efficient Distribution wit…Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima (1991)Computing Multi-Period, Infor…Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Moral Hazard and Renegotiatio…Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem (1990)Income fluctuation and asymme…Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma (1989)Renegotiation-proof equilibri…Renegotiation in repeated games (1989)Renegotiation in repeated gam…Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts (1989)Renegotiation and Information…Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games (1989)Collective dynamic consistenc…Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Incomplete Contracts and Rene…On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting (1987)On Repeated Moral Hazard with…Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing (1987)Costly Monitoring, Loan Contr…Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade (1987)Contractual Arrangements for …The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems (1985)The First-Order Approach to P…Repeated Moral Hazard (1985)Repeated Moral HazardOptimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification (1979)Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Some Evidence on the Empirical Significance of Credit Rationing (1992)Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence (1996)Banks and innovation: Microeconometric evidence on Italian firms☆ (2008)EQUILIBRIUM IN A PURE CURRENCY ECONOMY (1980)Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring (1990)Optimal Capital Income Taxation with Incomplete Markets, Borrowing Constraints, and Constant Discounting (1995)Chapter 8 Micro data and general equilibrium models (1999)Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation (2003)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring (1986)Optimal Unemployment Insurance (1997)Optimal Lending Contracts and Firm Dynamics (2004)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations (1979)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)The Management of Innovation (1994)Introduction: The Embeddedness of Economic Markets in Economics (1998)Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand? (1999)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment (2004)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships (2014)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Salaries and Piece Rates (1986)Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures (1999)On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting (1988)Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics (1989)Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt (1998)Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default (2000)Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory1 (2006)A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit with Risk of Default (2007)The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (1986)Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts (1987)Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory (1991)Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity (1997)The Adjustment of Consumption to Changing Expectations About Future Income (1981)Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts (1988)Communication, commitment, and growth (1992)Efficient Allocations with Hidden Income and Hidden Storage (2001)Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information (2006)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation1,885 cited
  • 1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
  • 1996Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment727 cited
  • 1987On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting641 cited
  • 1985Repeated Moral Hazard614 cited
  • 1989Renegotiation in repeated games603 cited
  • 1987Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing571 cited
  • 1992On Efficient Distribution with Private Information490 cited
  • 1990Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts410 cited
  • 1990Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem363 cited
  • 1987Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade304 cited
  • 1991Computing Multi-Period, Information-Constrained Optima268 cited
  • 1989Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games241 cited
  • 1989Renegotiation and Information Revelation over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts203 cited
  • 1989Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma151 cited
  • 1995Repeated Moral Hazard and One-Sided Commitment

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

138 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.