Program Accountability as an Emergent Property: The Role of Stakeholders in a Program's Field

Abstract

This article applies the concepts of organization field and accountability environment to a government-funded program. It argues that the formula for accountability inspired by agency theory—define performance standards, measure performance, and sanction based on measured performance—is frequently impossible to apply because program accountability can be an emergent property arising from the actions of the major actors in a program's field. Studying a program reform of social service transportation in Kentucky, it illustrates the utility of conceptualizing accountability as an emergent property of the program's field. After the principle actors in this program field—the transportation broker, the state, the transportation provider (such as a taxi company), and the riders—established their roles, there was a decline in program cost per rider and a reduction in waste and fraud. The article concludes with implications for designing more accountable programs.

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