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How and Why Bureaucrats Control their Governance Structure
16 references·1 citing·32 second hop
How and Why Bureaucrats Control their Governance Structure (1997)How and Why Bureaucrats Control their Gov…Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Production, Information Costs…Political Organizations (1995)Political OrganizationsWhy Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics (1994)Why Politics is More Fundamen…TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND (1994)TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AN…Managerial Dilemmas (1992)Managerial DilemmasInstitutions and Social Conflict (1992)Institutions and Social Confl…Hierarchical and Contractual Approaches to Budgetary Reform (1992)Hierarchical and Contractual …The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. (1991)The Three Worlds of Welfare C…Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond. (1991)Organization Theory: From Che…Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics (1990)Nested games: rational choice…Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)Compensation and Incentives: …The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1986)The Economic Institutions of …The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach (1981)The Economics of Organization…Toward a general theory of managerial discretion (1974)Toward a general theory of ma…Bureaucracy and Representative Government (1971)Bureaucracy and Representativ…A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1964)A Behavioral Theory of the Fi…A nova gestao publica na governacao local (2005)A nova gestao publica na gove…The Nature of the Firm (1937)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans (1980)Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships (1994)Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage (1998)Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital (2000)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)AFFECT- AND COGNITION-BASED TRUST AS FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERPERSONAL COOPERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003)Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device (1986)Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change (1994)Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community (1997)The Engines of European Integration (2003)Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England (1989)The New Politics of the Welfare State (2001)Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept (2002)A PUBLIC MANAGEMENT FOR ALL SEASONS? (1991)The Socialist System (1992)The New Public Governance? 1 (2006)HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1999)An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism (2001)Varieties of Capitalism (2001)The 'Southern Model' of Welfare in Social Europe (1996)The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality: Welfare State Institutions, Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries (1998)Cultural Backlash (2019)Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm (1996)Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of who and What Really Counts (1997)Dynamic capabilities: what are they? (2000)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism10,729 cited
  • 1996Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization9,565 cited
  • 1991The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.7,092 cited
  • 1981The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach6,452 cited
  • 1971Bureaucracy and Representative Government5,197 cited
  • 1964A Behavioral Theory of the Firm3,009 cited
  • 1992Institutions and Social Conflict2,472 cited
  • 1988Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory1,719 cited
  • 1990Nested games: rational choice in comparative politics1,336 cited
  • 1992Managerial Dilemmas867 cited
  • 1974Toward a general theory of managerial discretion469 cited
  • 1991Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond.264 cited
  • 1995Political Organizations228 cited
  • 1994TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND BEYOND129 cited
  • 1994Why Politics is More Fundamental Than Economics77 cited
  • 1992Hierarchical and Contractual Approaches to Budgetary Reform19 cited

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  • 2005A nova gestao publica na governacao local4 cited