Hume on the Abstract Idea of Existence: Comments on Cummins' "Hume on the Idea of Existence"

Abstract

general or universal ideas signify many particulars by signifying properties in those particulars. But these properties do not exist independently of those particulars. These ideas do not therefore represent or signify things that can exist as such, independently of particulars. “General and Universal ... belong not to the real existence of Things ... their general Nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding, of signifying or representing many particulars” (Essay, 3.3.11). Or again, Quoique toutes lea choms qui existent soient singulidres, neanmoins, par le moyen des abstractions que nous venons d‘expliquer, nous ne laissons pas d‘avoir toua plusieurs sorts d’idks, dont lea unesne nous representent qu’une seule chose, ... et les autres en peuvent egalement representer plusieurs, comme lorsque quelqu’un conpit un triangle sans y considbrer autre chose, sinon que c’est une figure trois lignes et B trois angles; l’idee qu’il en a formbe peut lui servir B concevoir tous lea autres triangles. (Logique, 1.6) In general, one forms the abstract idea of a specific property by separating that specific property from the concrete particulars presented to one; and one forms generic abstract ideas by separating the generic property from the specific. Volume XVII Number 2 169

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