Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

Paul Dicken

10 citations0/0 files storedThe British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Philosophy, Science, and History Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and History of Science

Abstract

James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism. 1. Ladyman's dilemma2. Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism3. Conclusion

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References

1982The Scientific Image.1991On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment 2000What's Really Wrong with Constructive Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality 2004Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality 2003Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism 2004Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A Reply to Monton and van Fraassen

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