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Executive option exercises and financial misreporting · Study

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ArticleExecutive option exercises and financial misreporting

Natasha Burns2007

Article2007

Executive option exercises and financial misreporting

Natasha Burns · Simi Kedia

65 citations·0/0 files stored·Journal of Banking & Finance

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

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References

1997A Survey of Corporate Governance 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors 1985Positive Accounting Theory 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover 1996Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*1985The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions 2008Executive compensation 2004CEO incentives and earnings management

Cited by

2012A Critical Analysis of Databases used in Financial Misconduct Research 2008Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes 2013Securities Fraud and Corporate Finance: Recent Developments 2020CEO compensation and firm performance in the insurance industry 2016The Association between Executive Pay Structure and the Transparency of Restatement Disclosures 2014Cumulative Prospect Theory and Managerial Incentives for Fraudulent Financial Reporting

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 13 shared references 2008Insider Trading Before Accounting Scandalsarticle · 12 shared references 2016Corporate Governance Consequences of Accounting Scandals: Evidence from Top Management, CFO and Auditor Turnoverarticle · 12 shared references 2006Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecastarticle · 12 shared references 2022Fraud in accounting and audit research (1926–2019) – a bibliometric analysisarticle · 11 shared references 2013Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got Therechapter · 10 shared references

Details

Year2007

Typearticle

Published2007-08-27

VenueJournal of Banking & Finance

ISSN-L0378-4266

Languageen

Citations65

Files0 public / 0

ShelfAuditing, Earnings Management, Governance

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doi10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.06.004

openalex_workW2052317629

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