The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories

Abstract

This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be “mapped” as an array with “horizontal” graded structures, multiply hierarchical “vertical” structures, and local “radial” structures. These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice.

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