SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth
2 references·4 citing·26 second hop
Why Expressivists about Value Should Not Love Minimalism about Truth (1994)Why Expressivists about Value Should Not …Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth (1994)Why Expressivists about Value…Truth and Objectivity (1992)Truth and ObjectivityDo ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism? (2012)Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of …SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM (2011)SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM“True” as Ambiguous (2008)“True” as AmbiguousHabermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge (2005)Habermas's Moral Cognitivism …Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1923)The complete works of Aristotle (1954)Introduction: Motivations for Relativism (2008)Recent work on alethic pluralism (2012)Validity for Strong Pluralists (2012)Tractatus logico-philosophicus (2021)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)The Sources of Normativity (1996)TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS (1979)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics (2013)Putting Pluralism in its Place (2016)Constructing Practical Reasons (2020)Philosophy and Public Affairs (1990)Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990)Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (1992)Jean Piaget (1896–1980) (2019)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Language, Truth, and Logic. (1938)The Moral Problem (1994)Symposium: realism and truth. Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty, Minimalism (1998)Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism (2003)Knowledge in a Social World (1999)Moral Realism (2003)The Emotional Construction of Morals (2009)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1992Truth and Objectivity1,483 cited
  • 1994Why Expressivists about Value Should Love Minimalism about Truth91 cited

Cited by

  • 2005Habermas's Moral Cognitivism and the Frege-Geach Challenge220 cited
  • 2008“True” as Ambiguous46 cited
  • 2011SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM44 cited
  • 2012Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?22 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work