SIMPLIFYING ALETHIC PLURALISM

Douglas J Edwards

44 citations0/0 files storedThe Southern Journal of Philosophy

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth.

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1981Reason, Truth and History 1979Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.1979TRUTH AND OTHER ENIGMAS 1992Truth and Objectivity 1970How to Define Theoretical Terms 1998Ruling Passions 1936Language, Truth and Logic 1998Truth

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2020Constructing Practical Reasons 2013Pluralism × 3: Truth, Logic, Metaphysics 2016Putting Pluralism in its Place 2012Recent work on alethic pluralism

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