Many externally motivated public sector reforms produce less change than expected. This article argues that we should expect limited reform results in respect of certain organizational attributes. Applying institutional theory on isomorphism, the argument is simply that reforms are harder where they influence organizational characteristics that (i) are difficult to observe externally, (ii) are core to the organization, and (iii) involve actors with whom the externally defined change agenda is unlikely to resonate normatively. These arguments are tested in an analysis of Public Financial Management (PFM) reform in Africa, where evidence is supportive. The article contributes to public management literature, and comparative studies in particular, by applying a well-suited theory to the study of public sector change. The approach and findings should be of particular interest to the development community, shedding light on why reforms routinely underperform—in PFM and beyond, extending to topics like externally driven nation building.
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