FORM OF CONTROL: A CRITICAL DETERMINANT OF ACQUISITION PERFORMANCE AND CEO REWARDS

Mark J. Kroll · Peter W. G. Wright · Leslie A. Toombs · Hadley Leavell

154 citations0/0 files storedStrategic Management Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

Based on two research streams, we investigate whether acquiring firms’ form of control might be associated differently with CEO rewards or excess returns. We theoretically reason that in manager-controlled corporations acquisitions may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders and CEO rewards might be based on nonperformance criteria. In owner-manager-controlled and owner-controlled firms acquisitions may benefit the stockholders. While CEO rewards of owner-controlled firms may be based on performance criteria, however, executive rewards of owner-manager-controlled firms may be based on both performance and nonperformance factors. The findings indicate that for manager-controlled firms acquisition announcements result in negative excess returns to shareholders. For owner-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms such announcements result in positive excess returns. The findings also suggest that increases in corporate size due to acquisitions are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards of manager-controlled and owner-manager-controlled firms. For owner-controlled firms, excess returns are significantly and positively associated with CEO rewards. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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References

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