In defense of a prototype approach to emotion concepts.

Abstract

Emotion, anger, fear, love, and similar concepts have so far defied classical definition. This article summarizes one analysis of emotion concepts from a prototype perspective and answers criticisms directed at such an analysis. Specifically addressed are 5 claims made by critics: The superordinate concept of emotion is classically defined; basic-level emotion concepts are classically defined; internal structure does not contradict the classical view; evidence of unclear cases, presented here as the cornerstone of the case against the classical view, does not contradict the classical view; and classical definitions for emotion terms, if they do not exist today, will someday be discovered scientifically. Both proponents and opponents of the prototype view may agree on a final assertion: Concepts can be created that are classically defined and that will be useful in the psychology of emotion. This assertion may be what the critics really care about. Emotion, love, anger, happiness, and anxiety express concepts that influence people's life. We interpret each other's actions and temporary states by means of these concepts and guide our behavior accordingly. An act seen as committed in the heat of emotion has a different legal status than the same act carried out in a calm manner. We wonder, Is this really love? and Do I still love him? According to Schachter and Singer (1962) and Harre (1987), to have an emotion can depend on how we label ourselves in terms of anger, happiness, and so on. Psychologists use these same words in communicating with

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