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Multilateral negotiations: a spatial analysis of the Arab–Israeli dispute
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Multilateral negotiations: a spatial analysis of the Arab–Israeli dispute (1990)Multilateral negotiations: a spatial anal…Models of strategic choice in politics (1990)Models of strategic choice in…Convergence of Least-Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information (1989)Convergence of Least-Squares …Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining (1989)Capabilities, Uncertainty, an…The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power (1987)The Institutional Foundations…Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria (1987)Signaling Games and Stable Eq…Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games (1987)Equilibrium Selection in Sign…Game Theory and Political Theory (1986)Game Theory and Political The…Sequential Equilibria (1982)Sequential EquilibriaStructure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice (1981)Structure-induced equilibrium…General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models (1979)General Conditions for Global…Instability of Simple Dynamic Games (1978)Instability of Simple Dynamic…Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (1977)Rational Behaviour and Bargai…Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control (1976)Intransitivities in multidime…Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games (1975)Reexamination of the perfectn…The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)The Theory of Committees and …An Economic Theory of Democracy. (1958)An Economic Theory of Democra…A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule (1967)Rationality and the Myth of the Maximum (1972)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Legislative leviathan: party government in the House (1993)Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work (2003)11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information (1953)Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Non-cooperative games (1989)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The Calculus of Consent (1960)Economic Analysis of Law (1974)HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1999)Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda (2004)American Economic Review (2019)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality (1981)Strategic Information Transmission (1982)Biological signals as handicaps (1990)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006)The Evolution of Cooperation (1985)The Evolution of Cooperation (1985)Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games (1988)A Grammar of Institutions (1995)POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONALISM: Explaining Durability and Change (1999)A Rational Theory of the Size of Government (1981)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (2005)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement (1976)Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (2014)Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach (1993)Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics (1997)Stakeholder Influence Strategies (1999)Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt (1991)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)An Evolutionary Approach to Norms (1986)Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes (1994)
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References

  • 1958An Economic Theory of Democracy.18,594 cited
  • 1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games3,342 cited
  • 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria3,227 cited
  • 1959The Theory of Committees and Elections.2,829 cited
  • 1982Sequential Equilibria1,703 cited
  • 1977Rational Behaviour and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations1,431 cited
  • 1976Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control1,349 cited
  • 1987Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games926 cited
  • 1987The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power838 cited
  • 1981Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice780 cited
  • 1986Game Theory and Political Theory716 cited
  • 1979General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models696 cited
  • 1978Instability of Simple Dynamic Games503 cited
  • 1989Convergence of Least-Squares Learning in Environments with Hidden State Variables and Private Information360 cited
  • 1989Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining358 cited

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1990
Models of strategic choice in politics
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