Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games

Jeffrey S. Banks · Joel Sobel

926 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Economic theories and models

Abstract

We present a refinement of the set of sequential equilibria [Kreps & Wilson (1982)] for generic signaling games based on rationality postulates for off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs. This refinement concept eliminates equilibria which Kreps (1985) and others dismiss on intuitive grounds. In addition, we derive a characterization of the set of stable equilibria [Kohlberg and Mertens (1982)] for generic signaling games in terms of equilibrium strategies and restrictions on beliefs. Examples are given which differentiate the predictions of these equilibrium concepts.

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References

1975Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games 1987Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria 1982Sequential Equilibria 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection 1986On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria 1984Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

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