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The Definition of Good
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The Definition of Good (1947)The Definition of GoodMore Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right (2019)More Seriously Wrong, More Im…Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? (2016)Moral Responsibility and the …Monism and Pluralism about Value (2015)Monism and Pluralism about Va…Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism (2014)Supervenience Arguments and N…Value and Reasons to Favour1 (2013)Value and Reasons to Favour1Partiality and Intrinsic Value (2011)Partiality and Intrinsic Value"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent (2011)"Ought" and the Perspective o…Responsibility, Reaction, and Value (2010)Responsibility, Reaction, and…TWO KINDS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (2009)TWO KINDS OF CONSEQUENTIALISMIncommensurability and Vagueness (2009)Incommensurability and Vaguen…Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge (2009)Fitting Attitude Analyses of …G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons (2006)G. E. Moore on goodness and r…Reasons and Value ? in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account (2005)Reasons and Value ? in Defenc…Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory (2005)Moral Phenomenology and Moral…Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism about Final Value (2004)Intrinsicalism and Conditiona…Tropic of Value* (2003)Tropic of Value*11. Reasons and Persons (1986)What We Owe to Each Other (2000)Ethics Without Principles (2004)A FAULT LINE IN ETHICAL THEORY (2014)Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness (2015)Are epistemic reasons normative? (2021)Value in ethics and economics (1994)Welfare, happiness, and ethics (1997)The pen, the dress, and the coat: a confusion in goodness (2015)The value of minimalist truth (2016)A theory of justice original editionEthics and the Limits of Philosophy (2006)Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value (2006)The Majesty of Reason (2010)The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐attitudes and Value (2004)Value, Reality, and Desire (2005)The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons (2011)Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives (1972)The Significance of Consciousness (1998)The phenomenologically manifest (2006)MORAL REALISM, FACE‐VALUES AND PRESUMPTIONS (2012)Philosophy of Mind : Classical and Contemporary Readings (2021)Practical Expressivism (2021)Agent-neutral deontology (2011)Does MITE Make Right? (2016)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)Two Distinctions in Goodness (1983)Necessity, Volition, and Love (1998)What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing? (2012)New work for a theory of universals (1983)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory (1996)Non-Naturalism and Reference (2017)Reality and Morality (2020)The Moral Universe (2024)The second-person standpoint: morality, respect, and accountability (2007)Moral Dimensions (2008)IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility (2020)Robot Responsibility and Moral Community (2021)Ignorance and Moral Responsibility (2022)Practical Reason and Norms (1999)Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness (2013)Rationality Through Reasoning (2013)Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance (2016)What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!) (2016)
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  • 2011"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent111 cited
  • 2005Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory74 cited
  • 2014Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism60 cited
  • 2009TWO KINDS OF CONSEQUENTIALISM58 cited
  • 2005Reasons and Value ? in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account56 cited
  • 2009Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge51 cited
  • 2013Value and Reasons to Favour150 cited
  • 2004Intrinsicalism and Conditionalism about Final Value50 cited
  • 2016Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal?47 cited
  • 2011Partiality and Intrinsic Value42 cited
  • 2003Tropic of Value*42 cited
  • 2010Responsibility, Reaction, and Value40 cited
  • 2019More Seriously Wrong, More Importantly Right34 cited
  • 2009Incommensurability and Vagueness34 cited
  • 2015Monism and Pluralism about Value32 cited
  • 2006G. E. Moore on goodness and reasons

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28 cited