Uncertainty about Probability: A Decision Analysis Perspective

Abstract

The issue of how to think about “uncertainty about probability” is framed and analyzed from the viewpoint of a decision analyst. The failure of nuclear power plants is used as an example. The key idea is to think of probability as describing a state of information on an uncertain event, and to pose the issue of uncertainty in this quantity as uncertainty about a number that would be definitive: it has the property that you would assign it as the probability if you knew it. Logical consistency requires that the probability to assign to a single occurrence in the absence of further information be the mean of the distribution of this definitive number, not the median as is sometimes suggested. Any decision that must be made without the benefit of further information must also be made using the mean of the definitive number's distribution. With this formulation, we find further that the probability of r occurrences in n exchangeable trials will depend on the first n moments of the definitive number's distribution. In making decisions, the expected value of clairvoyance on the occurrence of the event must be at least as great as that on the definitive number. If one of the events in question occurs, then the increase in probability of another such event is readily computed. This means, in terms of coin tossing, that unless one is absolutely sure of the fairness of a coin, seeing a head must increase the probability of heads, in distinction to usual thought. A numerical example for nuclear power shows that the failure of one plant of a group with a low probability of failure can significantly increase the probability that must be assigned to failure of a second plant in the group.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 69 citations exist upstream.