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On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation
10 references·1 citing·51 second hop
On the Value of Transparency in Agencies with Renegotiation (2004)On the Value of Transparency in Agencies …Informational costs and benefits of creating separately identifiable operating segments (2002)Informational costs and benef…Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation (2002)Accounting Policies in Agenci…Performance Measure Garbling Under Renegotiation in Multi-Period Agencies (1999)Performance Measure Garbling …Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting (1999)Dynamic incentives and respon…On the Frequency, Quality, and Informationl Role of Mandatory Financial Reports (1998)On the Frequency, Quality, an…Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle (1998)Earnings Management and the R…Arm's Length Relationships (1995)Arm's Length RelationshipsMoral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency (1991)Moral Hazard and Verifiabilit…Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard (1991)Adverse Selection in Dynamic …Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts (1990)Moral Hazard and Renegotiatio…Board Monitoring and Endogenous Information Asymmetry (2012)Board Monitoring and Endogeno…Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs (1982)Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device (2000)Proximity and Investment: Evidence from Plant-Level Data (2011)Labor Laws and Innovation (2013)Information, trade and common knowledge (1982)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings1 (1997)Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting: a comment (2003)Optimal auditing for insurance fraud (2009)The Psychological Attraction Approach to Accounting and Disclosure Policy* (2009)Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations (1991)Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Detecting Earnings Management. (1995)Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for Shareholders? (2003)Accounts Manipulation: A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework (2004)Do managers credibly use accruals to signal private information? Evidence from the pricing of discretionary accruals around stock splits (2005)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment (2004)Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation (2007)The Simple Microeconomics of Public‐Private Partnerships (2014)Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)The theory of the firm (1987)Optimal Performance Measures with Task Complementarity (2005)Information suppression in multi-agent contracting (2011)Managers’ Incorporation of the Value of Real Options into Their Long‐Term Investment Decisions: An Experimental Investigation* (2011)Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets (1983)Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships (1990)Renegotiation and Optimality in Agency Contracts (1994)LONG-TERM CONTRACTS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS (2000)Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem (2001)Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses (1997)The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management (2002)Corporate Conflicts of Interest (2003)The impact of governance reform on performance and transparency (2010)The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions (2011)An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers (1968)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)The joint effects of materiality thresholds and voluntary disclosure incentives on firms’ disclosure decisions (2009)Accounting Informs Investors and Earnings Management is Rife: Two Questionable Beliefs (2013)How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial Short‐Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency (2014)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations (2001)The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance (2012)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After (1994)Information Management in Incentive Problems (1997)Implementation and Renegotiation (1999)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1995Arm's Length Relationships441 cited
  • 1990Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts410 cited
  • 1998Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle308 cited
  • 1998On the Frequency, Quality, and Informationl Role of Mandatory Financial Reports259 cited
  • 1991Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency243 cited
  • 1999Dynamic incentives and responsibility accounting151 cited
  • 1999Performance Measure Garbling Under Renegotiation in Multi-Period Agencies139 cited
  • 2002Accounting Policies in Agencies with Moral Hazard and Renegotiation69 cited
  • 1991Adverse Selection in Dynamic Moral Hazard65 cited
  • 2002Informational costs and benefits of creating separately identifiable operating segments29 cited

Cited by

  • 2012Board Monitoring and Endogenous Information Asymmetry24 cited

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