Article1999

Performance Measure Garbling Under Renegotiation in Multi-Period Agencies

139 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Accounting Research

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Accounting and Organizational Management Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting

Abstract

Joel S. Demski, Hans Frimor, Performance Measure Garbling Under Renegotiation in Multi-Period Agencies, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 37, Studies on Credible Financial Reporting (1999), pp. 187-214

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 139 citations exist upstream.

References

1997Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives 2011The effects of bonus schemes on accounting decisions 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem 1995Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings 1997Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings 1995A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 1988Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model

Cited by

2002The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management 2003Corporate Conflicts of Interest 2010The impact of governance reform on performance and transparency 2006Agency Theory and Management Accounting 2005A contracting perspective on earnings quality 2004Equilibrium Earnings Management, Incentive Contracts, and Accounting Standards*

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.