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Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
2 references·16 citing·52 second hop
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this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1972Naming and Necessity7,026 cited
  • 1992Truth and Objectivity1,483 cited

Cited by

  • 2002The Harder Problem of Consciousness296 cited
  • 2009Against Arguments from Reference*185 cited
  • 1994Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse184 cited
  • 2004Vagueness in the World136 cited
  • 2005Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability114 cited
  • 2013Tarski and primitivism about truth112 cited
  • 2007Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity104 cited
  • 2003Should Deflationists Be Dialetheists?96 cited
  • 2013Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning93 cited
  • 2013The Primitivist Theory of Truth93 cited
  • 2000Indeterminacy, Degree of Belief, and Excluded Middle93 cited
  • 2020The Parmenidean Ascent84 cited
  • 2012Truth as a Substantive Property82 cited
  • 2001How Innocent Is Deflationism?74 cited
  • 2017Carnap, Quine, and Putnam on Methods of Inquiry

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68 cited
  • 2005TRUTH AND DISQUOTATION66 cited