A Theory Of Metaphysical Indeterminacy

Abstract

This chapter develops a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy. It construes indeterminacy as a metaphysical primitive and contrasts this approach to more familiar (semantic or epistemic) accounts of indeterminacy. It argues that there is no conceptual barrier to understanding indeterminacy along these lines. It then shows how indeterminacy (taken as a metaphysical primitive) can be explicated using familiar modal resources. Using this modal framework as a basis, the chapter develops a logic for metaphysical indeterminacy that is fully classical and bivalent. Developing this logic allows for the evaluation of key issues concerning indeterminacy, including higher-order indeterminacy, the interaction of indeterminacy and possibility, and de re indeterminacy.

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