Moral Vagueness Is Ontic Vagueness

Miriam Schoenfield

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

The aim of this essay is to argue that, if a robust form of moral realism is true, then moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. The argument is by elimination: I show that neither semantic nor epistemic approaches to moral vagueness are satisfactory.

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1983New work for a theory of universals 1978Can There Be Vague Objects?2000Shifting Sands 1994Vagueness Without Paradox 2001Vagueness and Contradiction 2011A Theory Of Metaphysical Indeterminacy 1992TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED 2012In defense of moral testimony

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