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ArticleMulti-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

David A. Besanko1985

Article1985

Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection

David A. Besanko

82 citations·0/0 files stored·Economics Letters

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Game Theory and Applications Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Auction Theory and Applications

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References

1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent 1982Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information 1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes

Cited by

2012Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process 2013Dynamic sender–receiver games 2015Dynamic screening with limited commitment 2015Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach 2015Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach 2010Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes 2021A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints 2015Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design

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1987Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contractingarticle · 4 shared references 1984Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agentsarticle · 3 shared references 1989Advances in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress.article · 3 shared references 1987Advances in Economic Theorybook · 3 shared references 2012The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liabilityarticle · 3 shared references 1982Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Imperfect Informationarticle · 3 shared references

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Year1985

Typearticle

Published1985-01-01

VenueEconomics Letters

ISSN-L0165-1765

Languageen

Citations82

Files0 public / 0

ShelfGame Theory and Applications

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doi10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3

openalex_workW2061688005

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