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Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
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References

  • 1982Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs1,724 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1983Limited liability contracts between principal and agent520 cited
  • 1982Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information270 cited
  • 1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes211 cited

Cited by

  • 2012Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process79 cited
  • 2013Dynamic sender–receiver games64 cited
  • 2015Dynamic screening with limited commitment55 cited
  • 2015Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach44 cited
  • 2015Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach40 cited
  • 2010Dynamic managerial compensation: On the optimality of seniority-based schemes34 cited
  • 2021A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints29 cited
  • 2015Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design29 cited
  • 2015Long‐Term Contracting: The Role of Private Information in Dynamic Supply Risk Management28 cited
  • 2006Contrats d'assurance multipériodiques et déformation des croyances

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