Modeling alliance activity: an iterated prisoners' dilemma with exit option

Richard J. Arend · Darryl A. Seale

53 citations0/0 files storedStrategic Management Journal

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Business Strategy and Innovation Game Theory and Applications Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

Abstract We present and solve a new, more accurate model of behavior within alliance activity. The model is essentially an iterated prisoners' dilemma with an exit option in each stage of the alliance. The proposed solution results in each partner receiving its opportunity cost as its expected average pay‐off in the alliance. Managerial implications include: identification of where to focus efforts to improve alliance cooperation and performance; and an explanation for why more sophisticated partnership strategies than tit‐for‐tat are likely to be superior in this game. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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References

1981The Evolution of Cooperation 1987The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1976Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.1986The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 1998The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational Competitive Advantage 1986Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy 1993Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy 1995DOES FAMILIARITY BREED TRUST? THE IMPLICATIONS OF REPEATED TIES FOR CONTRACTUAL CHOICE IN ALLIANCES.

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2022Strategic Alliance Outcomes: Consolidation and New Directions 2012Innovation analysis and game theory: A review 2006Modeling alliance activity: Opportunity cost effects and manipulations in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma with exit option 2010Exit, collective action and polycentric political systems

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