You and me

Guy Longworth

36 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophical Explorations

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Philosophy and Theoretical Science Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.

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References

1979The Problem of the Essential Indexical 2002Individuals 1984De Re Senses 1958Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects.1958Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects 1981Understanding Demonstratives 2024Do Demonstratives Have Senses?2010Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement

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