Evaluating the Growth of Helplessness Literature

Abstract

On reading the spirited arguments that Peterson has offered in defense of explanatory style as a psychological construct I have found myself of two minds. On the one hand, I agree with Peterson's contentions regarding the value of explanatory style, that it cannot be simply dismissed as an artifact or some low-level correlate of depression. On the other hand, I also have some of the disquieting feelings that may have inspired others to wonder about the meaning of explanatory style. Peterson reviews the criticisms that concern conceptual and methodological questions. In the former, Peterson argues quite convincingly for the utility of the explanatory style components (control, globality, and stability) and cites research findings indicative of that utility. At the same time, however, he wisely acknowledges that other dimensions might be equally useful. His admonition against chauvinism in the defense of one particular construct as opposed to another is an excellent point to which I return later. Perhaps the most exciting idea inheres in Peterson's discussion of a recent article (Peterson & Stunkard, 1989) in which the position was advanced that a host of variables (hardiness, locus of control, efficacy, sense of coherence, etc.) are cognates and may be combinable into a generic variable that can serve as a moderator of stressful experience. Although there is much that I admire in Peterson's discussion of conceptual issues, there are certain gaps due to the absence of the very ecumenism that Peterson would like to embrace. Peterson contends, for instance, that explanatory style has been misappropriated for purposes not conceptually relevant to the construct, as in the findings by McCormick and Taber (1988) that link explanatory style to chronic gambling. However, in both the literatures concerned with locus of control and achievement motivation, risk-taking in game situations, playing at lotteries, and other gambling-related behaviors have been found to be associated with externality and lower levels of achievement motivation; the reasoning linking these constructs with gambling is not dissimilar to what one might use if the predictions had been made with explanatory style. When people feel unable to win valued ends through their own efforts, or feel incapable of mastery (helpless), participation in chance-determined situations (e.g., gambling) often becomes preferable. The numbers racket flourished for years among the poorest Blacks in Harlem who saw no other way to accumulate wealth. Gambling seems to be a last resort when hope for successful outcomes that depend on skill and effort seems at its nadir. The major shortcoming of the research with explanatory style, then, derives from its parochialism and the consequent failure to expand the nomological network within which it functions. If one were to guess at why it is that the linkage between explanatory style and gambling does not seem more self-evident, it may be due to the history of the learnedhelplessness literature that has dwelt largely on the responses made to aversive situations. As Peterson notes, the response to has taken a back seat to the response to events. Gambling, though it can lead to bad consequences, is behavior aimed at the attainment of positive ends. Both the locus-of-control and achievement-motivation literatures concern exactly that, the persistence of the pursuit of positive ends. Here is one instance where wider scholarship, or conceptual ecumenism, might serve to clarify the nomological network within which explanatory style operates. This brings me to the disquieting feelings mentioned earlier. Peterson notes that he knows of no research concerned with the way in which good feelings can buffer the depressive effects of certain losses and disappointments. Yet, in the literature concerned with stress and the personality characteristics that can moderate the affective responses to stressors, there is growing evidence implicating positive mood, humor, optimism, and, again, sense of control. In one set of studies, humor (Lefcourt & Davidson-Katz, 1990b) is found to be not only a moderator of the stress-mood relationship, but also a predictor of immune system responses that may, in turn, mediate the relationship between mood dysfunction and illness. It has been difficult studying the effects of positive moods largely because, until recently, there has been a dearth of measurement tools appropriate to that study. Even the word moody implies negative affects. If there are criticisms to be leveled at Peterson's arguments, they are perhaps the same criticisms that can be directed at most research enterprises. Whether it is because it is terribly difficult to be knowledgeable about all relevant contributions or because we tend to be tribal and territorial in our research pursuits, we often fail to notice the relevance of others' ideas and research findings. In fact, we may find ourselves more threatened by endeavors that are near our own yet have a different language or set of procedures. Because of this failure to closely examine findings with closely related constructs, no discussions are raised in this article concerning the paradox that meta-analyses reliably link externality in regard to locus of control with depression and anxiety (Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufour, 1988), and that internality appears to be one of the more robust moderators of the relationship between stress and dysphoria (Cohen & Edwards, 1988). What might this mean when internality for negative events seems to have negative consequences in the explanatory style literature? Might internality in the latter research area be qualitatively different from internality in the locus of control literature? I could be tempted to begin framing an answer to this question, but the point I want to raise is about parochialism in psychology. It is easier to stay within one narrow frame of reference, to answer only the questions arising from within one's own conceptual point of view, than it is to deal with data and phenomena uncovered by other conceptual schemata. Efficacy is often discussed as if it has no historical roots in the expectancy or competence literatures; perceived control is treated as if social perceptions shaped by situational constraints have no relationship to stable beliefs about control. As Peterson maintains, however, most of these constructs are probably cognates and can be combined in some fashion to maximize our comprehension. Yet, the fact that most of the literatures concerned with these cognate

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