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Strict liability in a principal-agent model

13 references·3 citing·37 second hop

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References

1979Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship1,285 cited
1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
1985The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems870 cited
1980Strict Liability versus Negligence762 cited
1973Toward an Economic Theory of Liability561 cited
1984A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation504 cited
1982On Liability and Insurance259 cited
1982An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents196 cited
1984The Economics of Vicarious Liability170 cited
1980Constitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication160 cited
1980Strict Liability versus Negligence in a Market Setting127 cited
1983Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power123 cited
1982Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power80 cited

Cited by

2007Fisheries law enforcement—A survey of the economic literature69 cited
1995Vicarious liability under a negligence rule67 cited

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1997

The optimal level of corporate liability given the limited ability of corporations to penalize their employees

64 cited