A process model of intuition

Abstract

Intuitive judgements, in which individuals reliably detect a criterion above chance or advantageously use knowledge without knowing how they achieve this, are a fascinating field of psychological research. However, often the research does not go beyond a mere demonstration of an intuitive performance and does not ask for the mechanisms underlying these astonishing faculties. For the case of coherence intuitions, a procedural account is theoretically derived and empirically tested assuming fluency and affect as driving mechanisms. Causally isolating and manipulating these mechanisms made it possible to influence, disable, and even reverse intuitions. This fluency–affect intuition model (FAIM) holds valid for intuitions of semantic coherence, Gestalt intuitions, and artificial grammar learning, and is likely valid for other phenomena such as stereotype disconfirmation or the feeling of knowing. Future research avenues for process models of other intuitive phenomena are discussed.

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