Children's developing conceptions of the mind and brain.

Abstract

Previous investigators have examined children's knowledge about particular cognitive performances such as metamemory, or particular mental acts, such as dreams. The present research adds a new dimension by considering children's concepts of the mind as a whole. The development of concepts of both the mind and brain is examined in subjects from preschool age through adulthood. Evidence is presented to show that by ages 4 and 5 years children commonly regard the brain as an internal mindlike entity associated with a class of distinctly mental acts. This runs counter to previous characterizations of young children as failing to distinguish mental from overt behavioral acts. Young children begin with undifferentiated conceptions of the mind and brain. Both entities are regarded as necessary for mental, but not sensory-motor actions. In subsequent developments, the concepts of the mind and brain are differentiated along 2 lines. Ontologically, the mind is distinguished by its immateriality; functionally, the brain is distinguished by its involvement in bodily actions. The development of knowledge about the brain is discussed with respect to acquiring "popular" and "technical" definitions. The results are regarded as contributing toward understanding how children come to organize information about the mental world as a whole.

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